Category Archives: Sex Crimes

Cal. Sup. Ct Finally Sets Oral Argument On Case Involving Retroactive Sex Offender Registration

Here’s some good news for those hit with a requirement to register as a sex offender under P.C. 290 retroactively following their conviction (in some cases, decades earlier) for certain crimes.  As we reported two years ago, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to clarify “Whether, under California law, the default rule of contract interpretation is (a) that the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement binds the parties, or (b) that the terms of a plea agreement may be affected by changes in law” in Doe v. Harris.

Almost exactly two years later, the California Supremes have finally gotten around to setting the matter for oral argument, which will take place on Wednesday April 3,  2013 in Los Angeles.  Under the California Constitiution, the justices have 90 days to issue an opinion following oral argument (under threat of having their pay docked) so we should have a ruling on the question shortly thereafter.

–CAD

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9th Cir. Joins The Circuit Battle over SORNA

On Friday, the Ninth Circuit joined the battle pending between the Tenth and Fifth Circuits over whether Congress lacked tha power to enact the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which compels convicted State and Federal sex offenders to register with local authorities.

In United States v. Mark Steven Elk Shoulder, the Court held that subjecting defendants, like Mr. Elk Shoulder, who had been convicted prior to the enactment of SORNA in 2006 to its registration provisions did not exceed Congress’s constitutional powers.

Writing for the three-judge panel, Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta held “Accordingly, we join the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in concluding that SORNA’s registration requirement,§ 16913, and by extension, the statute penalizing failure to register, § 2250, were within the scope of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011) (assuming the constitutionality of the registration provision, and concluding that § 2250 was ‘a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.’); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of § 16913 ‘[b]ased on Congress’s authority to enact [defendant’s federal] statute of conviction’ and the Necessary and Proper Clause).”

Since the obvious challenges (like the Ex Post Facto clause) to the registration statute have already been tried and have been shot down by the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court, a disagreement between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits on one hand and the Fifth Circuit on the other is the best hope for those who would like to see the law struck down.

As Judge Ikuta noted “We recognize that the Fifth Circuit has disagreed with this conclusion, and held that Congress did not have the authority to require federal convicts who had ‘been unconditionally released from federal custody or supervision’ before SORNA was enacted to comply with its registration requirements. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d 232, 244, 253 (5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[a]fter the federal government has unconditionally let a person free, [ ] the fact that he once committed a crime is not a jurisdictional basis for subsequent regulation and possible criminal prosecution.” Id. at 234-35. In effect, the Fifth Circuit deemed the links between SORNA’s registration requirement and an enumerated Article I power to be per se too attenuated when applied to federal convicts already released from federal custody. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Comstock because the civil commitment statute in that case applied to prisoners still in federal custody. Id. at 236.” (Emphasis added).

Given the circuit split and the importance of SORNA’s retroactive application provisions, it would seem a cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court is likely if not certain. Until and unless that happens, sex offenders in the Ninth Circuit have lost another means of challenging their registration requirements.

==CAD

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Why No City Ordinance is Needed to Ban Public Nudity In San Francisco

While other cities fret about underfunded pension liabilities, here in San Francisco the latest keruffle is over the supposed “problem” of nudists in public spaces.

Of course, this being San Francisco, the measure is being pushed by the unfortunately-named Supervisor Scott Weiner, whose main target (based on published reports) seems to be the supposed practice of some nudists to wear “cockrings” or other devices to draw attention to their genitalia.

Lost in the debate are three fundamental (at least to a criminal defense attorney like me) questions. First, is the conduct targeted by the proposed ordinance a protected activity? Second, assuming the government can restrict the behavior, are extant State laws sufficient? Third, has state legislation already preempted the field of regulation of nudity in public spaces?

With regard to the first question, the general trend by courts in California seems to be not to grant First Amendment protection to public or private nudity unless the nudity is accompanied by or part of ” ‘some mode of expression which itself is entitled to first amendment protection.’ ” Elysium Institute, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles 232 Cal.App.3d 408, 424 283 Cal.Rptr. 688 (2nd Dist. 1991)[internal citations ommitted].

Of course, this raises as many questions as it answers–and it’s almost an invitation to anyone who wants to go sky-clad to chant political slogans or carry a sign when they do so. What about a naked man with an #occupy cockring?

It may, however, explain why Supervisor Weiner says wants to exempt events like the Folsom Street Fair and presumably, though he didn’t say so explicitly, the Dyke March and the Trans March from the proposed ordinance. Simply put, he’s not doing it out of kindness–those events, particularly the Dyke and Trans marches, are clearly political speech subject to First Amendment protections.

With regard to the second question, Penal Code Section 314(1) provides “Every person who willfully and lewdly…1. Exposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby…is guilty of a misdemeanor” (Emphasis added).

Of course, this begs the question “What does ‘willfully and lewdly’ mean for the purpose of the statute? Fortunately, the California Supreme Court settled this question over 40 years ago when it decided In re Smith, 7 Cal.3d 362, 497 P.2d 807 (1972).

In Smith the Court found a man who was arrested for indecent exposure under PC 314(1) was entitled to habeas corpus relief because “The necessary proof of sexual motivation was not and could not have been made in the case at bar. It is settled that mere nudity does not constitute a form of sexual ‘activity.’” (J. Mosk). Instead, the People would have to establish something more, such as “additional conduct intentionally directing attention to [the defendant's] genitals for sexual purposes” if it wanted to convict Mr. Smith of violating PC 314(1).

Similarly, a juvenile who “mooned” (i.e. exposed his buttocks) to traffic for reasons of adolescent jackassery could also not be found delinquent, since he lacked the lewd intent required by the statute (although he absolutely had the intent to annoy people) See In re Dallas W. 85 Cal.App.4th 937, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 (2nd Dist. 2000).

Going back to the cockring “problem”, since the purpose of a cockring is to draw attention to the wearer’s genitals, wearing one in public while nude would appear to make one subject to arrest for violating PC 314(1) based on the plain language of the Smith case. Thus, existing state law is more than sufficient to deter the supposed problem to be remedied and the ordinance is unecessary.

What about the final question–whether or not the State has preempted this area of regulation? Unfortunately, here things get murky. While a 1975 case out of the Second District upheld a Los Angeles ordinance banning public nudity in parks (on the somewhat tortured ground that the ordinance did not purport to ban all nudity across the City’s public spaces, but only regulate it as a time/place/manner restriction) see Eckl v. Davis 51 Cal.App.3d 831, 124 Cal.Rptr. 685 (2nd Dist. 1975) and held that the L.A. ordinance was not preempted by PC 314(1), it is unclear how modern courts would treat a similar issue today. Since Supervisor Weiner aims to ban nudity on public sidewalks as well as parks and beaches, the proposed ordinance has a far wider ambit than the measure challenged in Eckl and so the holding in that case is much less helpful to his case than it could be.

The bottom line is that–as with so many other public policy issues–what’s needed is not additional laws, but enforcement of existing laws. That would solve the “problem” of the nudists with cockrings, to the extent it’s not anecdoctal and actually exists. With regard to the wider issue of those who object to nude people in public, there’s an easy remedy which costs no public money, requires no court time and consumes no scarce jail space: look away.

–CAD

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9th Circuit Could End Retroactive Sex Offender Disclosure

Very interesting decision from the 9th Circuit this morning in Doe v. Harris where it asks the California Supreme Court to determine “Whether, under California law, the default rule of contract interpretation is (a) that the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement binds the parties, or (b) that the terms of a plea agreement may be affected by changes in law.”   When Mr. Doe (who is proceeding anonymously for reasons that will soon be obvious) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of committing a lewd act upon a minor, California Penal Code Section 290 required that he register with law enforcement, but that his registration records would not be accessible to anyone who wasn’t a peace officer.  Since he avoided any jail time and got five felonies dropped, this doubtlessly seemed like a good deal.

….And then “Megan’s Law” and its progeny on the state and federal level, which require states to disclose parts or all of a registered sex offender’s data to the public, were passed.  Worse for Mr. Doe and persons in his situation, Megans Law and its progeny are retroactive, sweeping thousands of people who pled guilty to registrable offenses within their nets of disclosure even though their pleas pre-dated the law.

When Mr. Doe sued to block disclosure of his information, the District Court found that since neither the People nor Mr. Doe’s attorneys made any reservation of rights as to future changes to PC 290, the parties must have based the agreement on the law as it existed in 1991 pre-Megan’s law and therefore blocked disclosure. The State appealed, leading to today’s certification question.

If the Ninth Circuit upholds the District Court, it could help thousands of people obtain relief from the retroactive effects of ever-stricter registration laws.  Stay tuned :)

—CAD

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9th Cir. OK’s “Lifetime” Supervision for Sex Offenders

In a 3-0 decision today in U.S. v. William Williams, the 9th Circuit OK’d the imposition of a “lifetime” supervision requirement (on top of a 15 year prison sentence) for a man found guilty of a probation violation for having child pornography on his computer.  (He had a previous child sex prior offense).   In its ruling, the Court held that the supervision was neither “disproportionate” given the circumstances of the case nor disproportionate given the severity of the crime.   Nor was the decision by the District Judge “subjectively unreasonable”.

The trouble with this rationale is that it is based on the 9th Circuit’s acceptance of the conventional wisdom that it was “likely” that Mr. Williams would commit similar crimes in the future.   Accepting that logic leads to two nasty logical cul-de-sacs, first, that rehabilitation is impossible and that prison is only about punishment and second, that the Court is somehow uniquely placed to fortell the future.

Ironically, by creating a situation whereby Mr. Williams has ZERO incentive to rehabilitate,  the Court virtually guarantees that he will likely reoffend, given the opportunity.

This is yet another reason why plea agreements in sex crims need to be closely reviewed before they are signed by the defendant and why the defendant’s attorney needs to assume that Congress and state legislatures will be likely to continue making registration requirements more stringent, usually on a retroactive basis.  Thus, a plea agreement to offense “X” that does not presently carry with it a registration requirement is not helpful if it is reasonable given the elements of offense “X” that lawmakers could impose one in the future.

–CAD

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